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Inconsistency and Contradiction 
JOHN N. WILLIAMS 
Inconsistency and contradiction are important concepts. Unfortunately, 
they are easily confused. 
A proposition or belief which is inconsistent is one which is self- 
contradictory and vice-versa. Moreover two propositions or beliefs which 
are contradictories are inconsistent with each other. Nonetheless it is a 
mistake to suppose that inconsistency is the same as contradiction. 
If a man believes that si, believes that S2, and believes that 
(SI & S2), then he does not hold contradictory beliefs, as he would were 
he to both believe that (sI & S2) and believe that -(SI & S2). Nor does 
he hold a self-contradictory belief, as he would were he to believe that 
[SI & S2 & '-(SI & S2)]. 
He does not hold contradictory beliefs, since there are no two beliefs 
which contradict each other. Moreover, the subtraction of any one of his 
beliefs has the result that it is now possible for all his remaining beliefs 
to be correct. Neither does he hold any self-contradictory beliefs, since 
there is no one thing believed from which two contradictory things follow. 
Yet since the conjunction of what he believes is self-contradictory and 
hence not possibly true, the fact that he holds all the beliefs which he 
does entails that they are necessarily not all true. Therefore his beliefs 
are inconsistent. 
Hence, while all believers who hold contradictory beliefs or hold a 
self-contradictory belief hold inconsistent beliefs, not all believers who 
hold inconsistent beliefs hold either contradictory ones or self-contradic- 
tory ones. 
In the light of this, the only reason that one could have for supposing 
that inconsistency is the same as contradiction is the view, conscious or 
unconscious, that to hold a conjunction of beliefs is to believe a con- 
junction. For were this so, then one who inconsistently believed that si, 
believed that S2 and believed that (SI & S2) would thereby also believe 
that (si & S2) and hence hold contradictory beliefs. 
This view is mistaken, however. To believe that p and to believe that 
q is not necessarily to believe that p and q. 
Were this not the case then all cases of holding beliefs inconsistent with 
each other would be cases of holding self-contradictory beliefs. For on the 
disputed view, one who both believed (SI & S2) and believed (sI & S2) 
would thereby believe that [(si & S2) & -(SI & S2)]. But it is surely 
implausible to suppose that holding inconsistent beliefs is always a matter 
of holding beliefs of what is self-contradictory. One can legitimately 
doubt whether self-contradictory beliefs are even possible, for normally, 
the falsity of such a belief is perspicuous to the believer. At the very 
least, lack of such perspicuity is uncommon. Yet notoriously, inconsistent 
sets of beliefs are not only possible, but difficult o avoid, especially when 
there are a large number of beliefs in the set, e.g. a belief that SI, a belief 
that S2, . . . a belief that sn and a belief that -(SI & S2 & ... & sn). 
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INCONSISTENCY AND CONTRADICTION 6oi 
A man who believes that p and believes that q, may have considered 
whether p and considered whether q, without having considered whether 
p and q, in which case he does not consciously believe that p and q. But 
there is neither any reason to hypothesise an unconscious belief that p and 
q, for the only reason one could have for doing so would be the very same 
view under dispute. Indeed, an extreme exampJe of this latter case 
involves holding contradictory beliefs. A may present an argument con- 
taining many premises, including p and including p, and being sincere, 
believe each premise separately. Although these premises may be per- 
spicuously contradictories when considered together, A may have only 
considered them separately, which allows him to believe that p and believe 
that -p. 
Suppose also, that A never believes what he knows to be false. This is 
surely possible. One surely does not believe what one does not under- 
stand. It would be ludicrous to credit someone with beliefs of things of 
which he had never heard or of which he had no understanding. But 
while A may believe and hence understand the proposition p, and also 
may believe and hence understand the proposition -p, he cannot believe 
the proposition p & p even unconsciously. This would entail that he 
understood this proposition, which being perspicuously self-contradictory, 
he would know to be false, and given the supposition of this particular 
example he would not believe. 
Moreover, a man who can 'only hold a few ideas in his head' might 
severally believe each of a large number of propositions without being 
able to understand or consider their conjunction, and therefore without 
being able to believe it. Such a man would be like a person in a super- 
market with a shopping list who can remember to buy each item upon 
seeing it, but who lacks the memory to write out the list for himself. 
The importance of the difference between inconsistency and contra- 
diction arises from the fact that whereas the discovery of contradiction 
in a man's beliefs is conclusive ground for censure, the discovery of 
inconsistency need not be. For if a man holds contradictory beliefs, e.g. 
believes that p and believes that -p, then clearly, he should give one of 
them up, for any evidence for the one will be evidence against the other 
and vice-versa, so that he will be unjustified in continuing to hold both 
beliefs. A self-contradictory belief, e.g. a belief that p & -p, is likewise 
irrational, since clearly there can be no evidence at all to justify it. On 
the other hand, an inconsistent set of beliefs may be epistemologically 
virtuous, for the evidence for each belief may be independent of that for 
any other, so that one is quite justified in holding each belief. For unlike 
a set of contradictory propositions, each of a set of inconsistent pro- 
positions may be logically independent of any one of the others. Where a 
man believes that si, believes that sn and believes that (s I & S2 & . .. sn) 
his confidence in each of si to sn may be justifiably high yet justifiably 
less than complete, so that the gaps in his confidence add up to a justifiable 
lack of confidence in their conjunction. 
Substantial evidence for the belief that -(SI & S2 & . . . & sn) may 
simply be that n is a very large number. In this case it is hard to see how 
it is evidence against any of the individual beliefs in si to sn. Indeed 
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the very same evidence which both justifies a belief that si and justifies 
a belief that S2 may justify a belief that (SI & S2). Suppose the evidence 
is that the probability that si is the same as the probability that s2 and 
this is , i.e. more probable than not. This justifies both a belief that si 
and a belief that S2. But it is also evidence that the probability that si 
and s2 is 2 x 2 i.e. 4, i.e. less probable than not. 
The moral of this is that one's attitudes to inconsistency should not be 
uncritically coloured by one's attitudes to contradiction,' for inconsistent 
beliefs may nonetheless be rational.2 
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